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  1Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the case for special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing 
countries within the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the particular instruments or 
exemptions it should cover. The S&D treatment currently allowed to developing countries in 
the Agreement and the use they have made of it is first described. The range of proposals put 
forward by developing countries (and by development NGOs in developed countries) is 
summarised, and the S&D provisions in the August 2004 Framework Agreement for 
Establishing Modalities in Agriculture are outlined. The reasons why developing countries 
want special and differential treatment under the AoA are discussed. Some of the main 
proposals in the Development Box are then reviewed in the light of the justifications 
presented by its proponents. The paper concludes that the potential exists in  the Framework 
Agreement to take a significant step towards “operationally effective and meaningful 
provisions” for S&D treatment. While noting this positive outcome, the important objective 
for developing countries of gaining a reduction in the trade-distorting support and protection 





  21. Introduction 
 
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Declaration launched the so-called Doha Development Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations in 2001. It reaffirmed that “special and differential treatment 
for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations on 
agriculture”. Special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries has been a 
principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since the 1960s and to date 
has taken two main forms: the granting of preferential access to developed country markets 
and exemption from disciplines applying to the protection of domestic industries under 
particular conditions. Preferential market access was justified as a means to encourage export 
diversification by developing countries in order to escape the ongoing decline in their terms of 
trade. Exemptions from the disciplines on the use of protective measures were justified by 
arguments that the trade policies appropriate to developing countries are different to those 
required in developed countries, that the developed countries themselves used selective 
protection in earlier periods, and thus that the policy disciplines which apply to the latter 
should not apply to the former. The meaning of S&D treatment changed during the Uruguay 
Round. Developing countries (apart from the least developed countries) were expected to 
assume the general obligations of membership. Instead, the focus shifted to one of responding 
to the special adjustment difficulties in developing countries which might stem from their 
implementation of WTO decisions (Whalley, 1999). This included a lower level of 
obligations and longer implementation periods, as well as technical assistance for capacity 
building. 
 
When disciplines on trade-distorting agricultural policies were included in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the principle of S&D treatment also applied to the 
treatment of developing countries under that Agreement. However, developing countries have 
argued that the Agreement represents a very unbalanced and skewed set of obligations. They 
argue that changes to WTO rules are necessary if they are to have the flexibility to implement 
specific policies to address their food security, rural development and poverty alleviation 
concerns. The exemptions and rule changes to the AoA sought by a number of developing 
countries have become known as the Development Box.   
 
This paper examines the case for a Development Box within the AoA and the particular 
instruments or exemptions it should contain. The paper begins by describing the current S&D 
treatment allowed to developing countries in the Agreement and the use they have made of it. 
The range of proposals put forward by developing countries (and by development NGOs in 
developed countries) is summarised, and the S&D provisions in the August 2004 Framework 
Agreement for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture (WT/GC/W/535) are outlined. The 
reasons why developing countries want special and differential treatment under the AoA are 
discussed. Some of the main proposals in the Development Box are then reviewed in the light 
of the justifications presented by its proponents. Noting that developing countries’ negotiating 
capacity is limited and the reality that it is necessary to prioritise policy options, the paper 
concludes by assessing the adequacy of the S&D provisions in the Framework Agreement in 
the light of the arguments presented. 
 
2.  Special and differential treatment provisions in the AoA 
 
Special and differential treatment is provided for developing countries in three main ways 
under the AoA. First, there are lower reduction percentages and longer implementation 
periods for the main commitments entered into. Second, there is greater flexibility in the use 
of certain policy instruments such as investment subsidies and export subsidies. Third, special 
commitments were entered into for net food-importing developing countries and least 
developed countries, known as the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative 
Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing 
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commitments,  no real action has followed from it to date.  
 
Developing countries were asked to take on reduction commitments two-thirds those of 
developed countries with respect to cuts in tariffs, domestic and export subsidies. In the case 
of market access, they could opt to use ceiling bindings to establish their initial tariff levels in 
the case of products where tariff levels were not bound. Few developing countries had bound 
their agricultural tariffs, and they were allowed to choose whatever initial level of tariffs they 
wanted from which to make reductions for these products. The tariff reductions for 
developing countries were 24 per cent over a ten year period beginning in 1995, compared to 
the 36 per cent average over six years for developed countries beginning in the same year. 
Least-developed countries were not required to undertake any reduction commitments, though 
they were expected to bind tariff and domestic support levels. Developing countries could 
also make use of a time-limited special treatment provision to exempt their staple food crop 
from the tariffication requirement, provided they provided some minimum level of market 
access (set at 4 per cent of domestic consumption in the base year by the end of the tenth year 
of implementation). Continuation of this exemption beyond the tenth year would have to be 
negotiated and accompanied by additional and acceptable concessions as determined in that 
negotiation. 
 
With respect to domestic support, developing countries are permitted a number of areas of 
greater policy flexibility under the Agreement. They are allowed higher de minimis 
percentages for Amber Box support measures of 10 per cent of the value of output (as against 
5 per cent for developed countries) for both product-specific and non-product-specific   
domestic support. This means that even developing countries with a zero Total AMS 
commitment could, in theory, provide up to 20 per cent of the value of their agricultural 
output as support to their farmers.
1 The constraint here is available budget resources rather 
than their WTO commitments (Matthews, 2003). Green Box measures for developing 
countries (those measures where there are no restrictions on how much countries may spend) 
are expanded to include government stockholding programmes for food security purposes 
assuming their operation meets certain criteria, as well as domestic food aid and subsidy 
programmes. Other measures exempted from reduction commitments under the Agreement 
include investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture as well as 
agricultural input subsidies which are targeted at low-income or resource-poor producers, and 
support to encourage diversification from the growing of illicit narcotic crops. Certain export 
subsidies are also excluded from reduction commitments, for example, subsidies to reduce the 
costs of marketing agricultural exports and those provisions which make internal transport 
charges on export shipments more favourable than those for domestic shipment. A starting 
point in considering an expansion of S&D in the Agriculture Agreement is to ask what is the 




A major achievement of the AoA was tariff binding. Developed and developing country WTO 
members bound almost 100% of all agricultural tariff lines. Most developing countries opted 
to use ceiling bindings rather than tariffication, and bound rates were set at high levels, 
though not for all countries. Egypt, Sri Lanka and several Latin American countries are 
countries with relatively low bound rates. Newly-acceding countries to the WTO (which are 
nearly all developing countries) are also required to offer low bound rates.  
                                                      
1 One of the inequities of the Uruguay Round AoA is that developing countries without any history of 
providing domestic support must cap their trade-distorting support under de minimis rules on a product-
by-product basis (in the case of product-specific support), whereas developed countries who may have 
built up significant levels of Amber Box trade-distorting support are not constrained in this way. 
  4Table 1. Flexibility provisions for developing country Members in the AoA 
Article 6.2  Investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture, agricultural input 
subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers, and 
support to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops, are exempt 
from domestic support reduction commitments. 
Article 6.4(b)  Higher de minimis percentage for AMS commitments under this paragraph of 10% 
(as against 5% for other Members). 
Article 9.2(b)  Lower rate of reduction for export subsidy commitments on budgetary expenditure 
and quantities benefiting from such subsidies. 
Article 9.4  Certain export subsidies are excluded from reduction commitments: subsidies to 
reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products, and providing 
internal transport charges on export shipments more favourable than those for 
domestic shipment. 
Article 12.2  Exemption for developing country net food importers from the requirement to give 
due consideration to the effects of export prohibitions and restrictions on other 
importing Members’ food security and to give notice and to consult with other 
importing Members on such measures. 
Article 15.1  General requirement that S&D should be reflected in the commitments undertaken 
under the AoA. This was implemented with respect to the market access, export 
subsidy and domestic support commitments by mandating reduction commitments 
two-thirds of those required of developed country Members.
1
Article 15.2
  Developing countries to have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments 
over a period of up to 10 years. Least developed countries not required to undertake 
reduction commitments. 
Annex 2  Governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes whose 
operation is transparent and in accordance with officially published criteria, as well 
as domestic food aid and subsidy programmes, are deemed to be Green Box 
measures. 
Annex 5  Exemption from tariffication for predominant staples provided certain minimum 
access opportunities are provided. 
1 The reduced level of commitments allowed to developing countries and reflected in their Schedules 
of Commitments are not specifically spelled out in the AoA itself but were reflected in the Modalities 
document on which commitments were based. 
 
Applied tariffs are much lower than bound rates. For 32  developing countries, a simple 
average of the applied rates is 20% versus the bound rate of 84% (Sharma, 2002). Matthews 
(2003) found almost identical numbers for an overlapping sample of 23 developing countries 
(18% as against 84%). Gibson et al. (2001) reach the same conclusion. Examining a sample 
of 12 Latin American countries with good data availability, they found that the average bound 
tariff level was 45% while the average applied tariff in 1998 was 13%, or less than one-third 
the bound level. They noted that applied tariff data were more difficult to source for other 
developing countries, but for a small sample of seven other developing countries they found 
applied rates averaged from one-quarter to about three-quarters of the bound rates.  
This evidence suggests that developing countries, on average, have not been making use of 
the flexibility they already have to raise tariffs on imported foods where they think this is 
appropriate. One reason may be that countries have been forced to lower applied rates as part 
of structural adjustment programmes. However, case study evidence suggests that low applied 
  5rates often reflect autonomous choices (Matthews, 2003). In many countries, applied rates are 
low as part of a strategy to keep food prices down for low-income consumers. In other cases, 
applied rates are low or have been lowered as part of a regional integration strategy with 
neighbouring countries.  
However, flexibility on average does not rule out the possibility that, for particular 
commodities, bound tariffs may constrain applied tariff levels. If so, this will apply a fortiori 
if bound tariffs are further reduced in the Doha Round. It is therefore probable that a larger 
number of countries would find that the tariff overhang will be reduced for a larger number of 
products and even that they may be required to reduce applied rates below those currently in 
force. 
Sharma (2002) argues that the cases where countries have difficulties living within their 
bound tariffs are often basic foods, where tariffs are often higher than the average rate and in 
many instances are supplemented by additional measures such as surcharges and variants of 
price band policies. The case study evidence from 23 developing countries summarised by 
(2003) suggests that applied rates are often close to bound rates for a wider range of products, 
including dairy products, poultrymeat and alcoholic beverages. This is an area where 
quantitative evidence for disaggregated commodities is as yet limited. 
Special safeguards 
 
One reason why a margin between bound and applied tariffs may be important to developing 
countries is that it gives them flexibility to adjust border protection to stabilise domestic 
prices in response to low world prices or import surges. Case study evidence has been 
presented of particular problems with specific commodities in particular countries. Oxfam 
quotes a number of examples where it claims small farmers have lost their livelihoods as a 
result of rapid liberalisation and the growth of imports (Oxfam International, 2002). Its 
examples include cheap maize imports from the US into Mexico as a result of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, rapid growth of imports of subsidised rice from the US into 
Haiti and of subsidised milk powder from the EU into Jamaica. Import surges do not have to 
be caused by subsidised imports; another Oxfam example is that imports of cheaper Thai rice 
into Senegal caused severe distress to that country’s domestic rice sector. FAO (2000) reports 
that Jamaica has faced difficulties in coping with import surges of various agricultural goods, 
including meat products and sugar. 
There are general provisions to deal with import surges under the WTO safeguards 
provisions. However, the existing safeguards provisions are difficult and time consuming to 
implement. Between 1995-2001, only seven developing countries initiated or implemented 
emergency safeguards for a total of 16 agricultural products (Sharma, 2002). This is a small 
number relative to the concern expressed. This might be because of the availability of other 
measures (particularly the ability to raise applied tariffs within the bound ceiling, although the 
existence of import surges suggests that governments did not resort to this option), because 
the import surges did not lead to negative effects (which is one of the conditions to trigger the 
safeguard), or, most likely, because the complexity of the emergency safeguard process made 
it too difficult for countries to use. 
Article 5 of the AoA allows countries which tariffied their non-tariff barriers in the Uruguay 
Round to make use of a Special Safeguard (SSG), provided that they reserved this right in 
their schedules. Only 21 developing countries are eligible for the Special Safeguard (SSG) 
provisions within the AoA, and then only on a limited range of nominated product lines. The 
limited evidence suggests that the clause has been rarely invoked (Ruffer and Vergano, 2002). 
The problems arising from an import surge can be serious for vulnerable agriculture. 
Developing countries and poor farmers have a limited capacity to adjust to a sudden upsurge 
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applied and bound tariffs shrink as part of the overall liberalisation of a new Round. The issue 
is therefore whether developing countries should be given access to a new safeguard 
instrument designed to allow them to protect themselves against import surges or periods of 
unduly low world prices. 
Minimum access commitments 
 
Those countries that undertook tariffication were required to offer minimum access 
commitments in the AoA. Only 14  developing countries made these commitments. They 
include Brazil, Costa Rica, Columbia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Panama, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia and Venezuela.
2 Minimum access 
commitments do not appear to have caused problems for domestic market management in 
developing countries to date. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were generally established for two 
categories of agricultural commodities: non-tradables and politically sensitive staples. TRQs 
are frequently reported for meat, dairy products, sugar, cereals and oilseeds. In the case of 
cereals and oilseeds, TRQs may have substituted for state-trading enterprises as a way of 
controlling imports. TRQ in-quota rates are only specified for two countries, but this is 
consistent with other evidence from the remaining countries that TRQs as originally 
envisaged are rarely being implemented. In over half the cases in which TRQs are reportedly 
being used, applied tariffs are being utilised. Applied tariffs are often low, and in many cases 
below the commitments for in-quota tariffs. Fill rates are low, but this does not seem to be 
due to institutional or licensing arrangements that might maintain protection. In many of the 
cases where low fill rates are observed, imports are on or above trend after 1994.  
Export subsidies  
 
Very few developing countries provide direct or indirect subsidies on agricultural exports so 
there is limited implementation experience on which to draw. There is some reported use by 
developing countries of the S&D treatment in Article  9.4, especially for high-value, low-
weight products like cut flowers, fresh fruit and vegetables (Matthews, 2003). 
Domestic subsidies 
  
Commitments on domestic support (Total Aggregate Measurement of Support or Total AMS) 
in the AoA were made overwhelmingly by developed countries. 96 of the 118 developing 
countries did not report AMS subsidies in their schedules and thus have no reduction 
commitments (their support measures fall, by default, under one or more of the exempted 
categories (Green Box, Article  6.2 or de minimis AMS). There are just 13 developing 
countries with Total AMS reduction commitments. 
Product-specific support (PS-AMS). Product-specific support in developing countries 
generally reflects market price support (as direct payments coupled to production are rarely 
used while input subsidies are rarely product-specific and thus fall under the NPS-AMS). 
Sharma (2002) notes the trend away from price support policies in developing countries, so 
that product specific AMS is becoming relevant for fewer commodities now than in 1986-88 
or even 1995. These policy changes are not due to the AoA but reflect the trend in policy 
reforms in most developing countries since the mid-1990s. 
For those countries with reduction commitments, the experience is mixed as regards whether 
their commitments were binding or not. There are some countries where actual support levels 
are high relative to committed levels, e.g. Thailand PS-AMS is now close to 100%, but for 
most countries with commitments AMS levels average around 25-30% of the ceiling limits.  
                                                      
2 The information in this paragraph is based on Abbott and Morse, 1999.  
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developing countries, 10% of the value of production of the commodity). There are also 
several countries in this group where the PS-AMS levels are close to the 10% limit, but on the 
whole levels are relatively low. As Sharma (2002) remarks: “In general terms, 10% of the 
value of production (not value-added) is a large amount for most major commodities to 
constrain product-specific subsidies”. 
Non-product-specific support (NPS-AMS). Sharma (2002) notes that, of the 22 developing 
countries with AMS information, only 11 have data on NPS-AMS. There are only two cases 
(India and Peru) where the ratio of NPS-AMS to the value of total agricultural production is 
high (7.5% and 6.2% respectively). The (unweighted) average for the other 11 countries was 
1.9%. The high percentages for India and Peru are partly because neither country made use of 
the Article 6.2 provisions designed to cover certain types of developing country expenditures.  
Article 6.2 measures. Article 6.2 provides scope to subsidise particular development measures 
in agriculture including investment subsidies generally available to agriculture, agricultural 
input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor (LI/RP) farmers, as well 
as to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops. Twenty-three developing 
WTO members have made use of this provision in one or more years since 1995. Only three 
countries (Malaysia, Morocco and Turkey) have outlays exceeding 2% of the value of total 
agricultural production, five countries are between 1-2% and the other 15 countries less than 
1% (Sharma, 2002). 
We conclude that the existing commitments on domestic subsidies have not been a constraint 
on developing country policies until now. Developing countries generally do not have the 
budgetary means to provide significant support to their farmers.  
Yet despite these existing provisions, many developing countries argue that there is a need for 
greater flexibility and additional exemptions. In a June 2000 submission to the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture, eleven countries – Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zimbabwe – suggested 
creating a Development Box to allow developing countries the flexibility to tackle food 
security (G/AG/NG/W/13). This was elaborated in a non-paper on special and differential 
treatment submitted by broadly the same group of countries in July 2001
3 and in  a subsequent 
non-paper on the Development Box by some members of the group in February 2002.
4 A 
further paper by the same group put forward specific proposals on modalities for special and 
differential treatment provisions.
5 India also submitted a proposal for a Food Security Box in 
January 2001 covering much of the same ground (G/AG/NG/W/102). At the WTO Ministerial 
Council meeting in Doha in November 2001, a loose alignment of countries calling 
themselves the ‘Friends of the Development Box’ was formed to promote acceptance of these 
ideas.
6 Development NGOs were also active in making the case for a Development Box 
(Green and Priyadarshi, 2001; Oxfam International, 2002; Solagral, 2001). A summary of the 
main ideas proposed for the Development Box is shown in Box 1.  
 
 
                                                      
3 WTO, Non-Paper on Special and Differential Treatment in Agriculture - Establishing the Objectives, 
submitted by Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture, July 2001. 
4 WTO, Non-Paper on ‘The Development Box’, Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, 4-8 
February 2002 (www.tradeobservatory.org). 
5 WTO, Proposals on modalities for further commitments in the area of market access, Special Session 
of the Committee on Agriculture, 2-3 September 2002 (www.tradeobservatory.org). 
6 Cuba; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Haiti; Honduras; Kenya; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; 
Senegal; Sri Lanka; Uganda; Zimbabwe. 
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Box 1. Potential provisions in a Development Box 
 
General 
Exempt certain products from AoA commitments, using either a negative or positive list
approach. 
 Under the positive list approach, all products would be exempt except those listed
by developing country members. This approach is used in negotiations on industrial tariffs
and services. Countries volunteer to include only those products in the Agreement they feel
ready for. Under the negative list approach, products would have to be nominated by
developing country members to be exempt from AoA commitments (it is envisaged that
these would be products important from a food security perspective). In other words, all
products are included unless a country explicitly decides to exclude one or more.
 
Market access 
Tariff reductions should be linked to reductions in trade-distorting support to agriculture in
developed countries. 
Basic food security crops should be exempt from tariff reductions or other commitments. 
There should be a right to renegotiate (upward) the low tariff bindings that apply to food
security crops where those bindings are low. 
Special safeguards providing automatic increases in tariffs, with a provision to impose
quantitative restrictions under specified circumstances in the event of a rapid increase in
imports or decline in prices, should be allowed. 




De minimis support ceilings for product-specific and non-product-specific support in
developing countries should be doubled to 20 per cent of the value of output. 
Domestic support exemptions should be expanded, for example, by allowing subsidised
credit and other capacity building measures as exemptions when provided to low income or
resource poor farmers. 
Developing countries should be allowed to offset negative product-specific support (i.e.
where farmers are taxed) against positive non-product-specific support (i.e. where farmers
are supported). 
Developing countries should be permitted to use measures to increase domestic production
of staple crops for domestic consumption. 
 
Export measures 
Flexibilities for developing countries to provide export subsidies in certain circumstances,
including those that reduce the costs of marketing and those that reduce charges for export
shipments, should be continued.  
 
 
Source: Drawn from Roberts et al., 2002; Ruffer et al., 2002.  
 
The extent to which these countries have succeeded in having their concerns recognised can 
be evaluating by examining the scope of S&D treatment proposed in the August 2004 
Framework Agreement. The principle of S&D treatment is accepted in Para. 2: “… the 
modalities to be developed will need to incorporate operationally effective and meaningful 
provisions for special and differential treatment for developing country Members. Agriculture 
is of critical importance to the economic development of developing country Members and 
  9they must be able to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their development 
goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns.” 
 
Market access. The Framework envisages a tiered formula under a single approach under 
which deeper cuts will be made in higher tariffs, but with flexibilities for sensitive products. 
There will be no general increase in tariff rate quotas, but the reduction or possible 
elimination of in-quota tariffs and improved quota administration have been agreed as ways to 
increase the fill rates of existing tariff quotas. Increased TRQ access will also form part of the 
balanced package to ensure a substantial improvement in market access for sensitive products 
where the tariff reductions will be lower than what would otherwise apply. The formula 
approach envisaged for tariff reduction has a number of characteristics which remain to be 
negotiated, including the number of bands, the thresholds for defining the bands, the type of 
tariff reduction in each band and the number and treatment of sensitive products. S&D 
treatment will be an integral part of all these elements of the negotiations. The Framework 
also envisages that developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, 
livelihood security and rural development needs which will be eligible for more flexible 
treatment. The criteria and treatment of these Special Products are to be further elaborated 
during the negotiation phase. Finally, the Framework envisages the creation of a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism for use by developing country Members. 
 
Domestic support. The Framework states that S&D treatment remains an integral component 
of domestic support. It is agreed that the modalities to be developed will include longer 
implementation periods and lower reduction coefficients for developing countries for all types 
of trade-distorting domestic support. Continued access to the provisions under Article 6.2 will 
be allowed. Reductions in de minimis are foreseen, but developing countries that allocate 
nearly all of their de minimis programmes to subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be 
exempt. 
 
Export subsidies. Developing country Members will benefit from longer implementation 
periods for the phasing out of all forms of export subsidies. Following the deadline for the 
phasing out of export subsidies in general, a time limit, to be agreed, will be placed on their 
continued access to the provisions of Article 9.4 permitting developing countries to provide 
limited types of export subsidies even where no such subsidies had been provided before. 
 
Whether these provisions provide an adequate response to the concerns expressed by 
developing countries, and how to spell them out in ways which will make them operationally 
effective, are the questions addressed in the remainder of  the paper. 
  
3.  The justification for special and differential treatment 
 
The original concept for S&D treatment for developing countries was developed in the 
context of disciplines on manufactured products. Exemption from the disciplines applying to 
developed country Members was justified as a variant of the infant industry argument, that the 
domestic industries of developing country Members needed more time and support in order to 
become sufficiently competitive to be able to stand on their own feet in competition with 
firms from other countries. This fear of the basic uncompetitiveness of much developing 
country agriculture in the face of the perceived competitive strengths of developed country 
agro-food complexes can be found behind some of the demands for S&D treatment in 
agriculture. But there are also a number of more specific arguments which are used to justify 
flexibilities with respect to WTO disciplines on agricultural protection and support in 
developing countries.  
 
Global models generally find that the bulk of the gains to developing countries from 
agricultural trade liberalisation come from their own policy reform, rather than from policy 
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Anderson (2002), which suggests optimistically that developing countries might gain $11.7 
billion from full agricultural trade liberalisation by OECD countries, but stand to gain $31.2 
billion by liberalising their own agricultural policies.
7  Given this presumption that 
developing countries have much to gain from fully participating in liberalisation efforts, why 
then are they apparently so keen to seek exemptions and exceptions which would allow them 
to opt out from, or certainly delay, liberalisation in the case of agricultural trade? 
 
The trade liberalisation damages food security argument. One line of argument, now more 
widely voiced by development NGOs in the North than by developing countries themselves, 
is that openness to trade is fundamentally damaging to food security in developing countries 
(see, for example, Madeley, 2000). Critics allege that the market-based model that advocates 
the liberalisation of international trade is not appropriate to developing countries. They argue 
that further liberalisation of trade and agricultural policies (by developing countries) will not 
help, and more likely will hinder them, in achieving their food security goals. They claim that 
the liberalisation of agriculture has mainly benefited larger, more export-oriented farmers and 
has led to the concentration of land ownership, thus marginalising smaller farmers and 
exacerbating unemployment and poverty levels.   This argument echoes the distrust of the 
pro-trade argument more generally. Proponents of this argument reject the fundamental tenet 
of the WTO that allowing countries to take advantage of trade is a good thing. S&D then 
becomes a rationale to enable developing countries to avoid making any commitments. For 
such critics, the Development Box concept is simply a way of reversing the integration of 
developing countries into global markets in general and global food markets in particular. The 
evidence does not support this extreme position (for example, the countries with the largest 
growth rates of cash crop production also had the fastest growth in food crop production, see 
World Bank, 2003) but this does not mean either that agricultural trade liberalisation may not 
give rise to specific problems where intervention might be justified (for a more nuanced view, 
see FAO, 2003). 
 
The different role of agriculture argument. The agricultural sector in developing countries 
has particular characteristics which may justify exemptions from general WTO disciplines. 
This includes its importance as a source of employment, contribution to GDP and foreign 
exchange. In itself, the relative size of a sector is not a persuasive argument to exclude it from 
WTO disciplines. More persuasive is the idea that there may be important spillovers or 
externalities from growth of agricultural output in developing countries. Agriculture-led 
growth strategies appear to have larger dynamic multipliers for the rest of the economy than 
other alternatives in poor developing countries (Delgado et al. 1998). Agricultural growth also 
tends to have greater impacts on the reduction of poverty (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995 and 
other references in Diaz-Bonilla et al., 2003). Mellor (2000) argues that there has been a 
tendency to generalise that economic growth reduces poverty, when in fact it is the direct and 
indirect effects of agricultural growth that account for virtually all of the poverty decline. 
Agriculture may have a particular role to play as a safety-net in developing countries for 
people who are unable to find alternative employment opportunities. Hence the importance of 
maintaining the viability of the sector, given the difficulties developing countries would face 
in providing alternative sources of employment for the rural poor if the size of their domestic 
agricultural sector were to shrink (Green and Priyadarshi, 2001).  
The weakness of agriculture argument. Here the emphasis is put on the weak market 
orientation, the lack of infrastructure and thus the difficulties developing country agriculture 
has in competing, and the consequent need to modernise the sector. For some commentators, 
the implication is that agricultural production needs significant support through a combination 
                                                      
7 This comparison exaggerates the gains to developing countries from OECD country agricultural trade 
liberalisation because it uses a database which does not take full account of the existence of preferential 
market access arrangements.  
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incentives required (Pearce  and  Morrison, 2001). Other commentators draw a different 
conclusion from the same diagnosis of weak agricultural structures. They argue that the 
underlying causes of these shortcomings need to be addressed if the potential benefits of trade 
liberalisation are to be realised. The role of S&D treatment is to give developing countries 
some breathing space to address the inadequacies in their domestic economies, which is an 
argument for longer transition periods, not for exemptions (Roberts et al., 2002). 
The food security argument. The need to take account of the development needs of 
developing countries, including food security and rural development, was reaffirmed in the 
Doha Declaration (para. 13). Many developing countries believe that a high level of food self-
sufficiency is a necessary condition of food security, and fear that agricultural trade 
liberalisation will increase their dependence on imported foodstuffs. Providing protection for 
the domestic production of food staples is thus seen as an important route to food security. 
But proponents of trade reform point out that national food self-sufficiency in itself is no 
guarantee of household food security where problems of access and utilisation persist (Gulati, 
2000). There is also potentially a very high cost in pursuing a food self-sufficiency strategy to 
food security if resources are attracted into relatively unproductive sectors at the expense of 
foregoing more remunerative opportunities elsewhere. 
The protection of the weak argument. While acknowledging that opening developing 
economies to international trade along comparative advantage lines can potentially make a 
bigger contribution to food security, critics point out that the impacts can vary greatly across 
different categories of farmers and also within households depending on the role of women in 
food production. In many countries, the poorer and more food-insecure farmers may not be in 
a position to take advantage of trade and may even find their livelihoods undermined (FAO, 
2003). However, trade policy is a very blunt instrument to address problems where rural 
communities and small farmers may be excluded from or damaged by open markets. More 
targeted investment policies and social safety nets are likely to be much more effective 
instruments to address these problems rather than border protection. 
 
The vulnerability argument.  Developing countries, and especially low-income farmers in 
these countries, are more vulnerable to the adjustment pressures caused by open trade 
policies. Given that the biggest source of price variability arises from domestic causes, the 
availability of trade plays an important role in price stabilisation. However, this does not 
diminish the argument that the world market can itself be a source of instability. Such 
pressures are of two kinds: (a) the transmission of the low points of fluctuations in world 
market prices into domestic markets, putting additional pressure on low-income farmers, and 
(b) the possibility of import surges. Add to this the more limited capacity of both private 
farmers and public institutions in developing countries to adapt to and mitigate the 
consequences of such instability. Both arguments may justify the maintenance of border 
protection measures to limit the transmission of world market variability into the markets of 
developing but not developed countries.  
The asymmetry of support argument. Finally, for many developing countries, Development 
Box measures are justified by the context that developed countries have the right to continue 
to provide significant subsidies and support to their farmers, while the rights of developing 
countries under the same Agreement are much more limited. Here the question to be asked is 
whether developing countries would not be more successful in tackling the root causes of 
these inequities directly through seeking more effective market access conditions and greater 
disciplines on developed countries’ use of trade-distorting support, rather than seeking to 
avoid the adverse effects of these policies by reinforcing their own protectionist policies in 
return. 
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poverty and food insecurity and to promote, or at least not constrain, the policy autonomy of 
developing countries in pursuit of these goals. As in the general debate on S&D treatment, 
there is a tension between those who argue for increased flexibility for developing countries 
on one or more of the above grounds, and those who argue that the danger to development is 
not the WTO disciplines but the flexibility to avoid them. Sharma (2002) points out: 
“Especially in the circle of trade negotiators and policy makers, there is a tendency to 
associate  less  binding commitments with positive  experience, in which case a negative 
experience would be where the rules and commitments restricted actions” (italics in original). 
For other observers, the great benefit of the AoA is indeed that it locks in policy reform. 
Preserving resources and employment in traditional structures of farming can slow the process 
of adjustment to more productive activities and reduce economic growth. 
There may be good reasons why developing countries may want to adopt policies that support 
or protect poor farmers in ways that are not always economically optimal. The most common 
explanation is that alternative forms of support (direct income support, safety nets) are often 
not practical in reality due to fiscal or administrative constraints (Ruffer et al., 2002). 
Governments may therefore choose to pursue second best solutions to problems of rural 
poverty and food security even at the cost of economic distortions. One criterion to judge 
Development Box proposals is whether they address a real problem which cannot be resolved 
in some other way. 
Based on these considerations, a set of criteria are proposed for use in evaluating 
Development Box proposals.  
•  First, would the measures proposed really help to improve food security, alleviate 
poverty and promote sustainable agricultural growth in developing countries?  
•  Second, would the additional policy flexibility actually be of value to developing 
countries? Would they use it? 
•  Third, what ‘price’ might have to be paid to gain acceptance for these concessions? 
This will depend on the willingness of developed countries to countenance 
concessions which, in turn, will depend on how trade-distorting (and thus damaging 
to their own producers) they expect them to be, and whether they perceive the 
measures to be an opt-out from liberalisation or motivated by a desire to address a 
specific policy problem.  
•  Fourth, would protective measures undertaken under the cover of the Development 
Box adversely affect other developing countries? Developing countries are an 
increasingly important export market for other developing countries. Although 
Development Box measures are often seen as protecting developing countries against 
competition from developed countries, their use in practice may be more damaging to 
developing country suppliers.  
 




The right to exempt particular food security products from further tariff reductions or indeed 
from tariff disciplines altogether, under either a positive or negative list approach, is the key 
component of the Development Box. Raising tariffs is attractive to a food-importing country 
because it can raise producer prices at low fiscal cost. However, many developing countries 
do not make full use of their existing tariff flexibility, suggesting that looking for additional 
flexibility would be a relatively poor deal in negotiating terms. On the other hand, if further 
tariff reductions are agreed under the Doha Round, tariff bindings could become more 
restrictive, and additional flexibility would become more valuable.  
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reductions or alternatively should be allowed greater flexibility to set tariffs at whatever levels 
they deem appropriate, at least for food security products, justify their case using four key 
arguments. 
 
•  The case for development tariffs, i.e. high tariffs are necessary to provide adequate 
incentives for producers in developing countries in order to encourage agricultural 
growth with its accompanying poverty alleviation and multiplier effects; 
•  The case for food security tariffs, i.e. levels of food self-sufficiency at world market 
prices or with low tariff bindings are insufficient to provide the level of national food 
security that developing countries desire;  
•  The case for stabilisation tariffs, i.e. tariff bindings should be sufficiently high to give 
developing countries the ability to vary applied tariffs in order to offset most or all of 
the price volatility arising from world market prices; 
•  The case for compensatory tariffs, i.e. high tariffs in developing countries are justified 
as a countervailing measure as long as developed countries continue to provide 
significantly larger amounts of trade-distorting support. 
 
These arguments can be criticised on a number of grounds.  For instance, given that poor 
households may spend as much as half of their income on food, raising tariff levels could 
have a negative impact on the living standards and food security of an increasing number of 
poor urban households and landless rural workers, as well as those poor small farmers who 
tend to be net buyers of food. Thus higher tariffs will impact differently on food security 
depending on whether the food-insecure are predominantly food producers or food 
consumers. 
 
Even if the poor are predominantly food producers, attempting to improve their situation by 
raising food prices will be relatively ineffective.  This is because it is the larger farmers, who 
have most to sell, who will disproportionately gain from higher food prices. Therefore,  there 
will be a significant leakage of benefits away from the poor under this policy. On the other 
hand, direct targeting of resources to directly benefit poor farmers may be administratively 
very difficult in the circumstances of certain developing and least developed countries. 
 
An important criterion in evaluating the case for treating developing country tariff policies 
differently is whether there are alternative WTO-compatible policies available to developing 
countries which could achieve the intended objectives. In many cases, other alternatives do 
exist (Diaz-Bonillo et al., 2003). Most evidently, domestic policies which ignore or even 
discriminate against domestic agriculture must be avoided. Farmers are still penalised in 
many developing countries as a result of persistent exchange rate over-valuation or neglect in 
public investment allocation. In such contexts, tariffs are often advocated as a second-best 
policy to address some of the fallout from faulty macroeconomic policies. Developing 
countries have the right under existing WTO rules to invest in a range of growth-enhancing 
policies, such as research, extension, irrigation, infrastructure, land tenure and organisational 
reforms,  to address supply bottlenecks in their agricultural sectors. These measures are all 
Green Box-compatible and not prohibited under the AoA.  Ensuring that developed countries 
reduce and eliminate their trade-distorting support to their farmers would also help to increase 
incentives to developing country agriculture.  
 
Developing country governments argue that they cannot afford to finance these growth-
enhancing policies. In this constrained environment, raising tariffs appears as an attractive 
way of raising farm prices (in food-importing countries) at low fiscal cost. But low fiscal cost 
should not be confused with low economic cost. There are real costs to a developing country 
economy which sets out to maintain a high level of uncompetitive food production as a long-
term policy.  Such transfers must ultimately be paid by someone, and if consumers are asked 
  14to pay through higher food prices, this will be reflected in higher wage demands and poorer 
prospects for the development of the non-agricultural sector in these economies. 
 
Taking account of all the arguments put forward, there is a case to allow more gradual tariff 
reduction commitments for food security products, but not to exempt these products entirely 
from further tariff reductions. Where existing tariff bindings are low, however, exempting 
particular food security products from further tariff reductions would be justified on second-
best grounds. As long as developed countries retain the right to impose high tariffs on imports 
of developing country exports, it seems indefensible to argue that developing countries with 
low tariffs on food security crops would be required to reduce them further.  The negotiating 
issue would then revolve around the appropriate minimum threshold for exemption. 
 
Whether countries whose tariff bindings on food security products are already below the 
minimum threshold should be allowed to increase them up to the threshold is more 
contentious. This step introduces a qualitatively different dimension, in that it seeks to 
withdraw market access commitments which developing countries entered into, and which 
other countries would feel they paid for with concessions of their own. Developing countries 
can argue, with some justice, that the concessions made by developed countries were, in 
practice, very limited. Nonetheless, it does not make sense to use negotiating capital to push 
this issue aggressively, given that the countries concerned have the right under existing WTO 
rules to raise these tariffs anyway, provided compensation is paid.
8 Many countries may be 
able to find other products where lower tariff bindings could be offered in exchange, or where 
minimum access commitments could be opened for those principal suppliers adversely 
affected. A clause stating that developed countries would exercise restraint in seeking 
compensation for loss of market access where tariffs on food security crops were raised would 
also be worth pursuing in the negotiations. 
 
The need for stabilisation - safeguards 
 
One of the arguments for exempting developing countries from the requirement to lower 
tariffs is that they are the only instrument open to countries to stabilise domestic markets in 
reaction to changes in world market conditions. As noted earlier, in many developing 
countries applied rates are often below bound rates. Developing countries with high bound 
tariffs can make use of this differential to raise applied tariffs in response to particularly low 
world market prices, as long as the applied tariff remains below or at the bound level. The 
stabilisation argument for the renegotiation or retraction of tariff bindings is to also permit 
this option for those countries with low bound tariffs on food security products.  
 
An alternative approach is to give developing countries access to a safeguard instrument 
which could, in practice, have the same effect. Safeguards are designed to protect against the 
adverse consequences of domestic market disruption caused either by unduly low-priced 
imports or import surges. The need to protect particularly vulnerable producers who have no 
safety-net options against price volatility transmitted from the world market is persuasive. 
There is a convincing case for making a special agricultural safeguard measure available to 
developing countries in the case of food security products, both for its substantive effect in 
protecting vulnerable producers against the worst effects of volatility in world market prices, 
and because it would make it easier for developing countries with high bound tariffs on these 
products to agree to significant tariff reduction commitments more generally. Such a special 
safeguard should be available on a permanent basis. However,  it may be difficult to get 
agreement on such an instrument for all developing countries, especially if the safeguard 
mechanism is to be a truly effective one. An effective safeguard exacerbates the adjustments 
                                                      
8 Compensation in this sense is not financial compensation, but means a reduction in tariffs or the 
opening of tariff rate quotas in other products to provide additional market access of equal value to the 
market access withdrawn in the case of the commodity whose bound tariff level has been increased. 
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which gave rise to the price change in the first instance. Technical discussions will be needed 
on the design of this mechanism with respect to trigger levels, duration and the level of 
additional duties which would be permitted. 
 
Domestic subsidy commitments  
 
The objective behind Development Box proposals in this area is that developing countries 
should not be prevented by AoA rules from pursuing policy interventions designed to 
encourage agricultural growth. As discussed earlier, whether current rules do constrain, or are 
likely to constrain, countries in the future is a moot point. The objective could be achieved 
either by raising the permitted ceiling for trade-distorting (Amber Box) AMS support 
expenditures in developing countries or by widening the exemptions granted in Article 6.2. 
As in the case of the interdependence between safeguards and bound tariff reductions, there is 
an inter-relationship between providing greater room to use trade-distorting subsidies and re-
classifying measures so that they are not deemed to be trade-distorting. To the extent that 
developing countries are given greater scope to exempt development supports from AMS 
disciplines, there is less need to raise the de minimis thresholds to accommodate these 
expenditures. Of the two options, the use of the Article 6.2 exemptions is to be preferred. 
 
The reason is that these policies are more likely to be targeted on improving agricultural 
productivity and growth potential. The only danger is that the most useful and effective 
agricultural policy interventions are already placed in the Green Box and are thus exempt 
from reduction commitments. Any extension of the list might include policies of dubious 
effectiveness, which developing countries might be best discouraged from pursuing in their 
own better interests.  However, some broadening of the exemptions covered by this Article 
could be considered (for example, extensions to cover concessional credit, transportation 
subsidies or assistance to producer groups or agricultural cooperatives could be made).  
 
An issue for consideration is whether there should be any requirement that any new 
extensions, or the current investment subsidies, should be targeted on low income and 
resource poor farmers as is currently the case if input subsidies are to be exempt under this 
Article. There is currently no definition in the AoA of this category. If food insecure countries 
were defined according to objective criteria (see later), it could be agreed that any 
developmental measures instituted by these countries would, by definition, be presumed to be 
in compliance with the Article 6.2 criterion for low income and resource poor producers. For 
other developing countries (presumably the more advanced) a definition (for example, based 
on landholding or a national poverty threshold) might be considered.  
 
As very few developing countries have AMS commitments greater than zero, the easiest way 
to raise the ceiling on permitted levels of trade-distorting support would be to raise the de 
minimis ceiling. While the current (higher) de minimis percentages should be maintained, 
there is little justification for seeking to increase them. The justification for maintaining the 
higher percentages is in recognition of the much higher levels of trade-distorting support 
permitted to developed countries under the current rules. But seeking an increase in these 
percentages is not likely to result in a commercially valuable concession, given the fiscal 
circumstances of most developing countries. Provided that any really useful promotional 
measures are exempted from reduction commitments through mention in Article 6.2, it is 
likely over time that the de minimis exemption would mainly shield price support policies. 
But as tariff levels fall, bound tariffs will place a ceiling on the extent to which domestic price 
support can be provided, further underlining the lack of utility in seeking to raise the de 
minimis ceiling. For those few developing countries with non-zero AMS entitlements, Article 
18.4, which acknowledges that excessive rates of inflation could adversely affect the ability of 
a country to abide by its domestic support commitments, should be strengthened to make sure 
that the real value of these entitlements is not eroded. It should also be made clear that the use 
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actionable under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 
 
De minimis thresholds apply separately to product-specific support (which is directed to 
individual commodities, such as an administrative support price for wheat) and non-product-
specific support (which is available to all commodities such as general input subsidies). Some 
countries, such as India, tend to tax farmers through product-specific support (by paying 
below world market prices) but compensate them through generous levels of non-product-
specific support. A specific demand is that developing countries should be allowed to credit 
any negative product-specific support against the non-product-specific de minimis support. It 
can be argued, with some justification, that the combination of taxing producer prices and 
compensating for this through subsidies on inputs is not an efficient agricultural policy and 
thus should not be encouraged through WTO exemptions. The counter-argument is that the 
WTO should refrain from dictating the domestic policy choices of Members where the impact 
of their agricultural policies on international markets is minimal as it would be in this instance 
where the trade effects of the two policies offset each other. On this argument, the measure 




If the purpose of the Development Box is to promote food security initiatives in food-insecure 
countries, then such countries need to be appropriately identified. The WTO has established a 
list of net food-importing developing countries and least developed countries for the purposes 
of the Marrakesh Decision.  This list currently comprises all least developed countries as 
defined by the United Nations as well as 19 other developing country members. However, 
there is widespread agreement that this list does not adequately capture all those countries  
which could be viewed as food-insecure (Stevens, 2002; Diaz-Bonilla et al., 2000).  
 
Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000) examine indicators for 167 countries to identify groups of countries 
which can be categorised as food-insecure according to five measures of food security: food 
production per capita, the ratio of total exports to food imports, calories per capita, protein per 
capita, and the share of the non-agricultural population. Their study identifies 12 clusters of 
countries according to similarities in their food security profiles. They define those four 
clusters with the lowest scores as ‘food insecure’. While the net food-importing category is 
poorly correlated with indicators of food insecurity, the least developed countries do 
correspond broadly with those countries deemed to be suffering from food insecurity  under 
this measure. 
 
On the other hand, as they point out, limiting eligibility for the Development Box just to the 
least developed countries would be a substantial retreat from the principle of special and 
differential treatment. It is a reasonable assumption that there are some non-least developed 




Ruffer et al. (2002) have also examined the classification of countries on the basis of five 
plausible criteria in order to define a food insecure country. They found that only seven 
countries (of which only 4 were WTO members on 1 January 2002) met all their criteria for 
food insecure countries where data existed! Their findings indicate that the classification 
question is not an innocent technical matter but is likely to prove to be highly controversial. 
Furthermore, the current category of net food importing developing countries, which was a 
                                                      
9 See Stevens (2002) for an attempt to define a list of countries that combine low real GDP per capita, 
high vulnerability and dependence on imported food. Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000) also produce a list 
based on their methodology. The Ruffer et al. (2002) comparison shows countries that would qualify as 
food-insecure under alternative classification criteria, but the authors do not propose their own list. 
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Decision which would continue even if a further category of food-insecure countries to 
receive Development Box treatment were to be defined. 
 
Recently, the International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council proposed a possible set 
of classification criteria (IPC, 2004).  It acknowledged that the inability to differentiate 
between developing countries made S&D treatment less effective, because developed 
countries were less willing to provide concessions to developing countries if the beneficiaries 
included some of the more competitive middle-income exporters. It proposes a three-fold 
distinction based in a modified way on the distinctions drawn by the World Bank and the IMF 
based on per capita income.  But while the World Bank distinguishes between low income, 
lower middle income and upper middle income developing countries, the IPC proposes to 
distinguish between least developed countries, lower middle income and upper middle income 
countries. The LDC grouping would be based on the UN definition (which includes 
institutional constraints as well as per capita income) but, in addition, would include all 
countries with a per capita income less than $900 (the World Bank uses a threshold of $765 
per capita to distinguish between low income and lower middle income countries). The IPC is 
opposed to granting special status to particular sub-categories like small island states, land-
locked countries or vulnerable economies. However, it proposes that countries should be able 
to apply for classification into the next lower category if their per capita income does not take 
into account unique vulnerabilities. It then argues that the degree of S&D treatment should be 
differentiated over these three groups, rather than two as at present. For example, with respect 
to market access, it suggests that upper middle income countries should accept the same tariff 
reductions as developed countries but with a longer implementation period, the lower middle 
income countries might be offered both lower reduction commitments and a longer 
implementation period, while LDCs would not be required to make reduction commitments. It 
would be encouraging if developing countries, and particularly the upper middle income 
developing countries, were to react positively to such a proposal in the ongoing negotiations. 
 
5.  Assessment of S&D treatment proposals 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture negotiated in the Uruguay Round does allow developing 
countries considerable flexibility to address issues of food security, rural development and 
poverty alleviation. Developing countries were able to opt for ceiling tariff bindings from 
which to implement their tariff reduction commitments for products subject to unbound 
tariffs. Reduction commitments were set at two-thirds those of developed countries and least 
developed countries were exempted from reduction commitments altogether. With respect to 
domestic support, specific measures to promote agricultural production in developing 
countries are exempt from reduction commitments and they have higher de minimis 
thresholds for trade-distorting support.  
 
Nevertheless, experience to date with the implementation of the AoA has revealed a number 
of major shortcomings. The huge imbalance in the amount of Green Box and trade-distorting 
support provided to developed country farmers compared to that available to developing 
country farmers, despite and indeed because of provisions within the AoA, leaves many 
developing countries fearful that further liberalisation of their agricultural policies will leave 
their farmers exposed to unfair competition. There is a general concern across many 
developing countries that poor farmers in these countries are much less capable of dealing 
with the consequences of world market price volatility and deserve some special protection 
against this volatility. Some countries which believe that food self-sufficiency is an important 
element in their food security strategy and those which have bound their tariffs on food 
staples at relatively low levels are concerned at the possible consequences for food security of 
further tariff reductions. Other countries are concerned that their ability to pursue growth-
promoting agricultural policies may be limited because they will come up against the low 
ceiling limits for domestic support. 
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This paper has highlighted where changes in the treatment of developing countries in the AoA 
would be desirable in the areas of tariffs, safeguards and domestic supports. In the case of 
tariffs, a lower rate of tariff reduction for a limited number of food security products, with a 
minimum threshold below which countries would not be required to go, at least until there 
had been a much more significant dismantling of agricultural protection in developed 
countries, would be justified. Countries whose bound tariffs were already below this 
minimum threshold have the right under existing WTO rules to raise these tariffs, although 
with the payment of compensation in terms of additional market access elsewhere to those 
import suppliers adversely affected. Developed countries might agree to exercise restraint in 
seeking compensation in the case of food security crops.   
 
A special agricultural safeguard measure on a permanent basis for developing countries is 
justified, particularly in the case of food security products. Technical discussions will be 
needed on the design of this mechanism with respect to trigger levels, duration and the level 
of additional duties which would be permitted. 
 
On domestic support, the exemptions under Article 6.2 should be maintained and, if 
necessary, broadened. With a sufficiently generous interpretation of permitted support 
measures, then the current de minimis percentages for developing countries should be 
maintained, but not increased. The justification for maintaining the higher percentages is in 
recognition of the much higher levels of trade-distorting support permitted to developed 
countries under the current rules. But seeking an increase in these percentages is not likely to 
result in a commercially valuable concession, given the difficult budgetary situation in most 
developing countries.  
 
Finally, there is the question of which countries would be eligible for S&D treatment. Here, 
the approach proposed by the IPC to adapt a per capita income based distinction but to allow 
countries which feel they have particular vulnerabilities (for example, a high proportion of 
people undernourished or a great dependence on a single or narrow range of commodity 
exports) to petition for more favourable treatment, is a promising one to pursue. 
 
Comparing these recommendations with the text agreed in the Framework for the modalities 
shows a high degree of overlap. The Framework recognises a category of Special Products 
based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs which will 
be eligible for more flexible treatment. The concept of a minimum threshold below which 
further tariff reductions would not be required does not appear explicitly, but could be 
incorporated into the treatment agreed for SPs.  The Framework text also commits to the 
establishment of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for use by developing countries, but is silent 
on the scope and mechanics of such a mechanism.  
 
On domestic support, the August 2004 Framework calls for reductions in de minimis taking 
into account the principle of S&D treatment. This is interpreted in the next sentence as 
meaning that developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis programmes for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt [from these reduction commitments]. It 
proposes to maintain access to Article 6.2 provisions but not to extend them. It also proposes 
to allow access to the S&D treatment provisions for export subsidies for a time-limited period 
after all other export subsidies have been phased out. 
 
Thus, the potential exists in the Framework Agreement to take a significant step towards 
“operationally effective and meaningful provisions” for S&D treatment. While noting this 
positive outcome, the important objective for developing countries of gaining a reduction in 
the trade-distorting support and protection by developed countries should not be forgotten. 
The danger for developing countries is that if too much of their negotiating effort is put into 
gaining special and differential treatment, less attention will be paid to gaining significant 
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developed country markets. This is a particularly important issue for those middle-income 
developing countries who may be asked to forego some of the benefits of the  new S&D 
regime as the price of reaching an agreement. If the market opening commitments are 
sufficiently attractive, it would be important not to lose the opportunity of taking advantage of 
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